Objective. To identify the proportion of community-dwelling elderly persons (70+) who could affect their eligibility for Medicaid financing of a nursing home stay through the use of a trust and to quantify the prevalence and predictors of trusts.
TRUSTS AND MEDICAID MORAL HAZARD
Irrevocable means the terms cannot be changed and the trustor loses complete control over the principal forever. A revocable trust can be changed at any time and provides no spend down benefit. Being irrevocable is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for Medicaid spend down protection.
To achieve spend down protection, assets must be placed in a trust well before the application for Medicaid. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 established a federal requirement of a 60-month "look back" period between the creation of a trust and application for Medicaid. A trust that is created and funded at death, or created before death but not funded until death is not Medicaid qualifying.
To achieve spend down protection, the trustee may be neither the trustor nor their spouse; loss of control over the principal by the trustor must be complete. A trust may be structured with the trustor or spouse also serving as trustee. This provides no spend down benefit but can provide tax and other benefits.
A trust may provide income to the trustor during his or her lifetime as stipulated in the creation of the trust. However, the trustor may not have access to the principal contained in the trust for it to be Medicaid qualifying.
Notes: Trustor is the person relinquishing control of assets and setting up the trust. Trustee is the person who owns and controls the assets and administers them as stipulated in creation of the trust. Beneficiary is the person for whom the trust is designed to benefit. the marginal tax rate ranged from 37% to 60% for estates valued at $20 million and over (Espereti, et al., 1996) . Thirtyfour states have no inheritance tax, and those that do vary in both marginal rates and size of estate that is exempt from tax, each of which typically varies according to whom is inheriting assets (children, sibling, nonfamily member; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1995; Orman, 1997; Ostberg, 1990) . Trusts can double the federal and state exemptions for inheritance taxes (Orman, 1997) .
Avoiding probate.-Reasons for avoiding probate include cost to the estate, delays in clearing probate, and public access to probate court records (Dacey, 1993; Orman, 1997) . The total cost of probate varies among states, from a low of approximately $750 for a $350,000 estate in West Virginia to a high of up to $10,000 in Connecticut, and it takes a minimum of 6 months in several states to 1.5 years in Indiana to complete the process (Roha, 1997) .
Direct expenditure.-A final competing motivation for trust creation is the desire to control expenditure of one's assets. Trusts are often used to bequeath wealth unequally to children, to give to charitable organizations, and to control spending in the event the person becomes disabled or is unable to make decisions (Espereti, et al., 1996) . A trust can remain in force after death.
METHODS
Approach.-This study tested for Medicaid moral hazard by estimating whether being able to qualify for Medicaid was an important reason for creating a trust in a national communitydwelling sample of elderly persons, while controlling for other motivations. If policymakers' concern that Medicaid moral hazard induces elderly persons to create trusts is correct, then we expect to find that individual characteristics related to needing nursing home care would be positively correlated with having a trust.
First, we estimated the number of elderly persons living in the community who would potentially benefit from creating a Medicaid-qualifying trust. Next, we estimated a model to test the competing motives for trust creation on the probability of having a trust. Finally, to place our investigation of trusts in context of other spend down mechanisms, we identified those elderly persons who achieved Medicaid eligibility by giving assets directly to children, over a 2-year period.
Data.-We used the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) database, Wave 1. AHEAD was designed for research on changes in assets and wealth, and their interrelationship with health among the elderly population after their main working years have ended (Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers, & Wallace, 1997) . AHEAD has a panel design with respondents between the ages of 70 and 90 years. Data collection for Wave 1 began in October 1993 and continued through May 1994. Eight thousand two hundred twenty-four respondents, 2,560 of whom were over 85 years of age, were included in Wave 1. Blacks, Hispanics, and residents of the state of Florida were oversampled.
Our multivariate analysis was conducted at the household level. Our sample included 5,767 of the 6,014 households who received the full battery of questions. There were 2,072 couple households (4,144 individuals) and 3,617 single households. The primary reason for missing values was the lack of a state identifier for households, which prevented us from assessing Medicaid eligibility and several other state-specific covariates. We compared those households missing state identifiers with those having them. They were similar on basic demographic variables. We presented our data at the individual level (N = 7,761; 4,144 persons from 2,072 couples, and 3,617 single households) to illustrate the distribution of total respondents according to Medicaid spend down status (Figure 1) .
We analyzed the existence of a trust for couples and singles separately. In the case of couples, characteristics of both the male and female members of the household were included as explanatory variables. To measure spend down motivation, we included three binary variables that determined potential to use a trust to become Medicaid eligible. The first identified those households never eligible based on income, the second those with assets greater than a 5-year stay in a nursing home, and, finally, those for whom spend down would occur in less than 5 years, but who were not eligible for Medicaid at the time of the survey. The reference group was eligible households in the community based on income, assets, and spousal impoverishment provisions at the time of the survey. Only 8% of the elderly entering a nursing home remain longer than 5 years (Murtaugh et al., 1997) . We used 1994 Medicaid rules and 1992 average daily nursing home price, inflated to 1994 dollars using the medical Consumer Price Index. Persons never eligible based on income were those with incomes above a fixed state income limit, or those with incomes greater than the average nursing home price in states with no income limit but that apply medical expenses against income for purposes of establishing eligibility for Medicaid.
Personal characteristics relating to the probability of needing nursing home care were measured separately for both the male and female member of a couple. The first was each respondent's estimate of the probability of needing nursing home care within 5 years, and the second was the self-assessed probability of living for at least 10 years. We included a binary variable equal to 1 if a respondent had a missing value for either subjective assessment question, because of a substantial number of missing values for these two variables. Among couples, 552 men (26.6%) and 469 women (22.6%) had missing values on at least one of these variables, as did 1,283 singles (35.5%).
We also used number of limitations in activities of daily living, measured on a scale from 0 to 6. Cognitive status was a binary variable, with 1 when respondents answered 10 or more items of the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status correctly. Finally, we included a binary variable for self-assessed health status equal to 1 when respondents reported their health was "good" to "excellent" relative to others their age, with "fair" and "poor" the omitted reference group, a measure shown to predict survival (Dasbach, Klein, Klein, & Moss, 1994) and use of personal health services (Pope, 1988) . However, the effect of health status on long-term care coverage is ambiguous (Kumar, Cohen, Bishop, & Wallack, 1995) .
To measure tax motivations for creating trusts, we included variables for the combined federal and state inheritance tax rate given respondent net worth and number of children. We controlled for number of children since persons with more may have a higher bequest motive and are thus more likely to try to avoid inheritance taxes.
To measure the motive for avoiding probate, we created binary variables for whether a state had stringent lawyer fee regulation for probate, whether a respondent's assets would qualify for an affidavit estate transfer in the respondent's state (which generally does not allow for transfer of a house), and whether a respondent's assets would qualify for a summary probate procedure. The dollar value for the size of estate qualifying for a summary probate procedure ranged from $3,000 in Alabama to $100,000 in Nevada in 1994 (Hughes & Klein, 1996) . To the extent that administrative costs of probate are lower because of summary probate or affidavit transfer, fewer elderly persons should want to create trusts to circumvent probate. However, to the extent that the state statutes are a binding constraint on lawyers' fees, lawyers may push trusts for which there is no fee regulation.
For the motive of controlling one's assets, we included binary variables for whether the household donated at least $500 in the past year to charity, whether the will provided for unequal shares of the bequest for children (we used the will of men for couples), and whether the will provided for charity. Persons with charitable motives and with wills that benefited children unequally would be expected to be more likely to have a trust to control assets.
We included demographic characteristics for race (White), education (less than high school), age, and whether the interview was completed by a proxy. The analysis was run separately for married couples and singles. For singles, a binary variable equal to 1 was included if they were widowed, as was a control for gender (female =1).
Finally, we included variables for household net worth other than primary housing wealth, net worth in primary place of residence, and nonearnings household income in the previous year. A binary variable was also included for missing income in the past year. We specified wealth in this way because Medicaid excludes housing wealth from the asset screen for eligibility if there is a positive probability that the nursing home resident will return there (see e.g., Budish, 1995) .
Estimation.-Mulitvariate logistic regression was used to estimate the probability of a household reporting a trust in Wave 1 AHEAD. Robust estimates of standard errors were obtained using the Huber-White sandwich estimator procedure (STATA Corporation, 1997). Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square and ROC statistics were used to assess the goodness-of-fit of the models.
RESULTS
Approximately 40% of the respondents could potentially alter their Medicaid status by creating a trust (Figure 1) . A roughly equal proportion were eligible for Medicaid financing of a nursing home stay while in the community, and 1 in 5 could not alter their Medicaid status through the use of a trust because their nonearning income was too large.
Four hundred forty-four of the 5,689 households (7.8%) reported a trust in Wave 1, with 6.3% of single households and 10.4% of couples reporting a trust. We compared the characteristics of respondents with and without a trust at Wave 1, for both the single and couple sample (Table 2) . Most of the mean values were significantly different. Those with a trust were wealthier, faced a higher combined inheritance tax rate, were more educated, were more likely to be White, and were more likely to have a will that leaves money to a charity and which was designed to benefit children unequally, contingent upon having children.
Among couples, male and female values of individualized explanatory variables were generally similar, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, when comparing those with and without a trust. However, in the case of expectations of needing nursing home care within 5 years, and of living at least 10 years, this pattern did not hold. Men in couples with a trust were significantly more likely than those without a trust to believe they would move to a nursing home within 5 years, but women did not differ in this respect. Women in couples with a trust had a higher expectation of survival, but there was no difference among men.
Having more assets to protect were the strongest predictors of having a trust in multivariate models (Table 3) . Couples with nonhouse assets equal to more than a five-year nursing home stay were the most likely to report a trust (adjusted odds ratio 5.58 [95% CI 2.40,12.98]). However, those couples who could never qualify for Medicaid because of their income were nearly as likely to have a trust (5.06 [95% CI 2.32,11.07]). A weaker, but statistically significant effect was detected for couples whose assets were equal to at least 1 day in a nursing home, but less than 5 years (2.27 [95% CI 1.05^.91]). All comparisons were against couples that were eligible for Medicaid while in the community at the time of the survey. For singles, relationships were similar, but weaker.
When male members of a couple viewed themselves as more likely to live at least 10 more years, the household was less likely to have a trust (0.54 [95% CI 0.31,0.94]), whereas the effect of the same variable for women had the opposite effect (1.71 [95% CI 0.99, 2.96]) and was nearly significant at conventional levels (P = 0.053). Notably, the subjective probability of needing nursing home care within 5 years for the male or female did not have a significant effect on the existence of a trust, for couples or singles.
Female members of a couple who reported their health status was the same or better than others their age were about 50% more likely to be in a couple with a trust (1.57 [95% CI 1.00, 2.46]). The point estimate for male self-assessed health status was similar (1.49) but was less precisely measured (P = 0.055). None of these variables were significant predictors of having a trust among singles.
We found that some persons set up trusts to avoid probate. Couples living in states with stringent probate lawyer fee regulations were about two thirds more likely to report having a trust relative to those in states without strict controls, suggesting lawyer created demand for trusts (1.64 [95% CI 1.18,2.28]).
Also, control of assets was a motive. Couples who reported a provision in the male's will that benefited a charity were more likely to report a trust (2.36 [95% CI 1.47-3.77]), and singles whose will benefited their children unequally were more likely to have a trust (1. .37
Notes: p value is for the significance level of a t test (two-tailed). Numbers are percentages, except in the case of ADLTimtlations^ndincome/wealth variables which areM.
Tor variables specified for men and women among couples, the single comparison for that variable is shown across from the male couple value, regardless of the .557
Notes: Odds ratio, 95% confidence Interval and p value are from logistic regression. a Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square was used because Pearson chi-square showed that the number of covariate patterns was nearly as large as the number of observations. Hosmer-Lemeshow was calculated after grouping the predicted probability of having a trust into 10 groups; lack of statistical significance signifies good fit.
b Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve is a graph of the sensitivity (fraction of y = 1 cases correctly classified) against 1-specificity (fraction of y = 0 correctly classified) as the cutoff c is varied. An ROC of 0.5 would signify a model with no predictive power (a 45 degree line), while 1.0 would signify a perfect model. increase in likelihood of having a trust), but age of the woman in a couple was not statistically significant. For singles, both measures of wealth and yearly income were significant predictors of having a trust, with persons with higher wealth being more likely to have a trust. For couples, there was no independent wealth effect once the couple's spend down status was assessed.
We conducted sensitivity analysis of the way in which income and wealth were entered into the model, specifying the variables as quartiles. The results for couples were not sensitive to the functional form of these variables, but among singles, when wealth and income were entered as quartiles, the variables representing time to spend down were not statistically significant.
There are other ways in which an individual may purposefully achieve spend down to Medicaid. Between Waves 1 and 2, a 2-year time interval, 113 respondents achieved Medicaid eligibility after giving a substantial gift (in terms of proportion of their wealth) to children. Twelve of these persons reported a subjective probability of needing nursing home care within 5 years of 0.5 or better. These twelve cases combined potential spend down motivation with an act that achieved spend down eligibility. Only 1 of the 113 persons gave away assets that were equal to more man a 5-year stay in a nursing home to achieve spend down.
DISCUSSION
We do not find much evidence that Medicaid spend down is commonly achieved by the use of a trust. Trusts were rare among community-dwelling elderly persons-less than one in 10 had them-in spite of several motivations for their creation and a cottage industry that touts the various benefits of trusts for the elderly person (Dacey, 1993; Hughes & Klein, 1996; Orman, 1997) . By comparison, 1 in 100 members of the total sample gave assets to their children between Waves 1 and 2 that qualified them for Medicaid financing of a nursing home stay. Comparison of wealth distributions with the Health and Retirement Study (respondents 51-61) rule out prior inter vivos transfers before persons reach the age of our sample (70+) (Smith, 1997) . Many elderly persons (roughly 40%) were poor enough to qualify for Medicaid financing of a nursing home stay while living in the community.
While several of our findings are consistent with the hypothesized Medicaid spend down motivation, it appears that trust creation is generally most strongly associated with high wealth. For example, our finding that those with assets equal to more than a 5-year nursing home stay are more likely to have a trust could be construed as support for a hypothesis that trusts are used by the wealthy to achieve spend down. However, having income which would preclude ever spending down, regardless of asset level, was also predictive of having a trust, although such a trust could never achieve spend down. Finding that level of wealth is related to having a trust is in line with other research on a less restricted age group (Wolff, 1994) . On balance, we also found evidence supporting trust creation for the purpose of avoiding probate and preserving control of assets after death.
Several differences between men and women and between couples and singles provide some evidence regarding trust creation behavior. Couples in which the man expected to live longer were less likely to have a trust, the opposite effect being true for women. This suggests couples are more likely to plan for the future with a trust when the woman is seen as likely to live relatively long and face the prospect of being widowed for a longer time. Men who expect to live longer do not appear to see a need for trust creation, suggesting they believe they will be around to "take care of things." However, when the man was more disabled, net of other factors, the couple was more likely to have a trust, possibly anticipating the need for long-term care (the ADL limitation variable may be picking up some of this type of effect for men with missing nursing home expectation information, which was substantial).
The decision of singles to create a trust is not affected by longevity expectations, probably showing they do not have to worry about widowing a spouse. However, single trust creation does appear to be related to a person's history of making charitable donations, and of creating a will to benefit children unequally, suggesting past experience with detailed financial/estate planning (having a will specifying unequal bequest to children). Singles are also more likely to create a trust given a higher expectation of moving to a nursing home in the near term. The most likely motive given other findings is that singles are moving to maximize their estate available, either to children, or to charitable concerns, whereas among couples, the spouse, not the children, is foremost in motivating estate planning via a trust.
Our research is subject to several important limitations. First, we analyzed the existence of a trust in a cross-section. In preliminary analysis, we looked at trust creation and found it to be extremely rare between Waves 1 and 2 of AHEAD (a 2-year period). The next several waves will allow for a more complete follow-up to identify those respondents that ultimately enter nursing homes, allowing for a link between estate planning activities, family structure, perceptions of need, and actual behavior. Second, all trusts do not achieve Medicaid spend down protection. The AHEAD data in Wave 1 did not ascertain whether a trust was irrevocable, a necessary but not sufficient condition for spend down protection. In Wave 2, such information was ascertained, but preliminary attempts to link Waves 1 and 2 to infer the type of trust present in Wave 1 proved to be too inaccurate. Further, the proportion of trusts in Wave 2 that were irrevocable was so small as to make multivariate analysis impractical, as well as to suggest that virtually no one had a trust that could achieve spend down. Third, it is possible that elderly persons who have created trusts for the purpose of achieving spend down protection may be understandably unwilling to admit this. However, the question regarding existence of a trust was not asked in the context of Medicaid estate planning, lessening the risk of purposeful nonreporting.
The study sample consisted of elderly persons 70 years of age and older who lived in the community. A community sample is best to investigate trust creation to spend down because a nursing home-based sample would not be able to observe the forward-thinking actions necessary for an elderly person to qualify themselves for Medicaid. Even before the provisions of OBRA 1993 took effect (which expanded the look back for trusts to 60 months), the vast majority of the group most likely to benefit from the use of trusts to spend down did not have one.
Our results suggest that there is limited rationale for further public policy efforts designed to limit the use of trusts to achieve spend down, because such behavior is rare. However, the baby boom generation has accumulated large amounts of wealth over the past three decades, particularly in relatively liquid forms of retirement savings, such as 40IK or 403B accounts, as opposed to nonbequeathable pensions. This means that the potential motivation of sheltering such assets from use to pay nursing home costs may increase. Monitoring future use of trusts for purposeful spend down may be necessary to ensure that the purpose of the Medicaid program, to provide a safety net for the poor, is not circumvented.
